Informal Collateral Consequences by Logan, Wayne A.
Florida State University College of Law
Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
10-2013
Informal Collateral Consequences
Wayne A. Logan
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 1103 (2013),
Available at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/167
10 - Logan Essay.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2013 10:59 AM 
 
INFORMAL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
Wayne A. Logan* 
After a thirty-year punitive binge, the nation is in the process of 
awakening to the vast array of negative effects flowing from its 
draconian crime control policies.1 The shift is perhaps most evident in 
the realm of corrections, which since the early 1980s has experienced 
unprecedented population growth.2 Driven by a number of factors, not 
the least of which is the enormous human and financial cost of mass 
incarceration,3 policy makers are now shrinking prison and jail 
populations4 and pursuing cheaper non-brick-and-mortar social control 
options.5 
This Essay examines another facet of the shift: increasing concern 
over collateral consequences, the many ostensibly non-penal sanctions 
attaching to convictions, which have proliferated in recent years6 and 
* Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Jack 
Chin, Matthew Lister, Margaret Colgate Love, and Jenny Roberts for their very helpful comments 
on the paper. Thanks also to participants at the collateral consequences workshop hosted by the 
University of Minnesota Law School’s Robina Institute, especially Professors Anthony Duff and 
Susan Sered, who provided valuable insights as commentators. Finally, thanks go to Josephine 
Ennis, J.D. 2013, for her expert editorial assistance. 
1. On the political and social catalysts behind the nation’s shift toward increased punitiveness 
more generally, see JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Paul J. Larkin, 
Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & POL’Y 715, 722–55 (2013). 
2. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 1 fig.1 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
cpus11.pdf. 
3. The reform efforts of the “Right on Crime” movement, comprised mainly of fiscal 
conservatives otherwise typically staunch crime-control advocates, evidence this shift. See RIGHT 
ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2013).  
4. See NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, ON THE CHOPPING BLOCK 2012: STATE 
PRISON CLOSINGS (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/On%20the%20 
Chopping%20Block%202012.pdf.  
5. See id.; see also THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING 
DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 6 (2011); Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The 
Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 636–40 (2012). 
6. See Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A 
National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10, 11–15 
(surveying marked increase in collateral consequences between 1986 and 1996); Michael Pinard, 
Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214–15 (2010) (“At no point in United States history have collateral 
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impose disabilities that often dwarf in personal significance the direct 
consequences of conviction, such as imprisonment.7 Long the focus of 
critical scholarly commentary,8 collateral consequences recently drew 
the attention of the Supreme Court in its landmark decision Padilla v. 
Kentucky9 holding that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to be 
informed of a collateral consequence (in Padilla, deportation) attaching 
to a guilty plea.10 Further testament to the national concern, the 
American Bar Association is now compiling a comprehensive inventory 
of collateral consequences imposed nationwide,11 casting in bold relief 
the many “invisible punishments” to which convicted individuals are 
subject.12 
The attention now being paid to collateral consequences is most 
assuredly welcome. Missing from the reappraisal, however, is attention 
to the range of informal consequences of conviction. Unlike formal 
collateral consequences, such as loss of public housing eligibility, 
deportation, occupational disqualification, or electoral 
disenfranchisement, these consequences do not attach by express 
operation of law. Rather, they are informal in origin, arising 
independently of specific legal authority, and concern the gamut of 
negative social, economic, medical, and psychological consequences of 
conviction. For instance, it is well known that a criminal conviction can 
legally disqualify an individual from an occupation and housing; yet, a 
conviction also has a very negative impact on individuals’ job and 
housing prospects even absent such formal disqualifications. No less 
significant are the negative social and economic effects felt by third 
consequences been as expansive and entrenched as they are today.”).  
7. The category of “collateral consequences” actually encompasses two forms of non-penal 
disability: a “collateral sanction,” imposed by operation of law as a result of conviction; and a 
discretionary “disqualification,” also arising from conviction, but imposed after an individualized 
inquiry by a legal authority. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 2(2), 
(5), 8 (2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_ 
final_10.pdf. Consistent with common usage, the broader category is used here. 
8. For just a few of the myriad examples, see Neil P. Cohen & Dean Hill Rivkin, Civil 
Disabilities: The Forgotten Punishment, 35 FED. PROBATION, June 1971, at 19; Nora V. 
Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing 
Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective 
on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly 
Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006).  
9. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  
10. Id. at 360. 
11. See AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/CollateralConsequences/ 
map.jsp (last visited Aug. 22, 2013).  
12. Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 16 (Marc Mauer & 
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (coining phrase).  
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parties of convicted individuals, especially dependents, yet these effects 
too have gone largely unacknowledged in the post-Padilla discourse. 
This Essay makes the case that attention should be directed to the 
array of formal and informal collateral consequences alike that are 
associated with criminal conviction. Part I provides an inventory of 
informal collateral consequences, which include the negative effects for 
individuals of stigma, diminished housing and economic opportunities, 
and ways in which conviction can adversely affect the well-being of 
third parties, such as family members. Part II examines the meager 
extent to which such consequences have figured in criminal justice 
doctrine and policy to date, especially relative to plea advisement and 
negotiation, and argues for a more robust understanding. Part III offers 
recommendations on how this fuller understanding can be 
operationalized. 
The task undertaken here is as timely as it is important. While the 
nation’s appetite for incarceration appears to be waning,13 state, local, 
and federal criminal justice systems continue to adjudicate millions of 
cases annually,14 and little reason exists to conclude that criminal 
prosecution and conviction will abate as the preferred public response to 
misconduct.15 As criminal justice actors and policymakers have become 
sensitized to the adverse effects of the formal collateral consequences of 
conviction, so too should they take account of informal collateral 
consequences, which can have an equal if not greater effect on 
individuals’ lives. 
I. INFORMAL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
A criminal conviction, while a culminating event in the criminal 
justice process, carries with it an array of negative consequences. The 
most concrete and well-known consequence involves the deprivation of 
13. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 1 
(2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf (noting that during 2011 the 
number of prisoners in state and federal facilities declined by 0.9%, the second consecutive year of 
population decrease). 
14. See GLAZE & PARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that at yearend 2011 
just under 7,000,000 individuals were under adult correctional supervision of some kind, roughly 
one of every thirty-four residents). 
15. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55–56 (2011) 
(tracing nation’s evolution toward view that “a healthy criminal justice system should punish all the 
criminals it can.”); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
27, 44–49 (2011) (lauding recent decreases in imprisonment rates but questioning whether they will 
be sustained when budgetary conditions improve, absent greater public sensitivity for the adverse 
human consequences of mass imprisonment).  
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liberty, by means of imprisonment or community supervision.16 Perhaps 
less well known, until Padilla at least, conviction very often also triggers 
an array of formal collateral consequences.17 This Part provides an 
overview of the many informal collateral consequences of conviction, 
arising outside formal operation of law, significantly affecting the lives 
of convicted individuals. These negative consequences, ranging from 
social stigma to diminished housing and employment opportunities, very 
often also have a spill-over effect on friends and family. 
Social stigma has long been recognized as a defining consequence of 
criminal conviction.18 While in the past opprobrium associated with 
criminal status visibly manifested in physical branding and mutilation,19 
over time, societies, including early America, adopted a more forgiving 
outlook. As the New York Court of Appeals put it in 1936, persons 
convicted of crimes are “not outcasts, nor to be treated as such.”20 
In recent decades, however, this forgiving sentiment has been 
replaced by a far harsher view. Today, convict status serves as a 
perpetual badge of infamy, even serving to impugn reputation beyond 
the grave.21 One data point highlighting this shift is found in the 
significantly decreased application of the executive pardon authority.22 
Another is the current nationwide network of sex offender registration 
and community notification laws, which took root in the 1990s.23 The 
laws require the assemblage of conviction and personal identifying 
information on eligible individuals, and make the information publicly 
available by way of the internet and other means, often for registrants’ 
lifetimes.24 Fairly capturing modern sentiment, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
16. See GLAZE & PARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1–2 (noting that at yearend 
2011 almost 7,000,000 individuals were under adult correctional supervision and that roughly 
seventy percent of this population was on probation or parole). 
17. See supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text.  
18. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 
(1958). 
19. See Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in OXFORD HISTORY 
OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 48 (Norval Morris & David 
J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
20. People v. Pieri, 199 N.E. 495, 499 (N.Y. 1936).  
21. Perhaps the most notable example of this can be found in how, after police fatally shot an 
unarmed man, then-Mayor of New York City Rudolph Giuliani, in an effort to curb public uproar, 
stressed that the victim had a criminal record. See Eric Lipton, Giuliani Cites Criminal Past of Slain 
Man: Pressed on Shooting, Mayor Criticizes Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at B1.  
22. See Margaret Colgate Love, When the Punishment Doesn’t Fit the Crime: Reinventing 
Forgiveness in Unforgiving Times, 38 HUM. RTS., Summer 2011, at 2, 5–6.  
23. For discussion of the history and social and political catalysts behind the laws, see WAYNE A. 
LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS 
IN AMERICA 49–108 (2009).  
24. See id. at 49–84 (discussing laws).  
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posited in the 2002 oral argument in Smith v. Doe, involving a 
constitutional challenge to registration and community notification, that 
targeted individuals “deserve[] stigmatization.”25 
Stigma can affect individual well-being in a variety of ways. Research 
dating back to the 1960s, for instance, highlights the significant social 
and psychological difficulties associated with criminal stigma.26 More 
recent research makes clear that stigma can have a self-fulfilling 
criminogenic effect, predisposing individuals to become the deviants 
they were branded to be.27 It is also not uncommon for convicts to be 
singled out for death, beatings, arson, and vandalism by fellow 
community members.28 
A criminal record can also have profound economic impact, serving 
in Professor James Jacobs’ words as a “negative curriculum vitae” for 
individuals.29 Criminal records, now more readily available than ever 
before,30 have been shown to significantly diminish near and long-term 
economic well-being.31 A criminal conviction often serves as a de facto 
informal basis for job denial,32 augmenting occupational bars triggered 
25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-729), available 
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/01-729.pdf. 
26. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963); 
SHLOMO SHOHAM, THE MARK OF CAIN: THE STIGMA THEORY OF CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVIATION 
(1970).  
27. See, e.g., Bruce C. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363 
(2001); Terri A. Winnick & Mark Bodkin, Anticipated Stigma and Stigma Management Among 
Those to Be Labeled “Ex-Con,” 29 DEVIANT BEHAV. 295 (2008). Such outcomes, it warrants 
mention, are fostered by the common use by police of individuals’ criminal histories to justify 
searches and seizures. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Henry, 48 F.3d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
Police resort to such information has been significantly eased by the advent of portable hand-held 
devices. See Wendy Ruderman, New Tool for Police Officers: Records at Their Fingerprints, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2013, at A17 (noting officer use of new handheld smartphone devices that allow for 
immediate access to individuals’ criminal records). 
28. See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 125–27.  
29. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal 
Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2008). 
30. See id. at 177–78.  
31. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 
112–20 (2003); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF 
PRISONER REENTRY 151–85 (2005); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 
937 (2003).  
32. On the disinclination of employers to hire ex-offenders more generally, see Harry J. Holzer et 
al., Will Employers Hire Former Offenders?: Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their 
Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205, 
209–10 (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004). Research also makes clear that even employers reluctant to 
acknowledge a policy of not hiring ex-offenders show a marked disinclination to actually hire ex-
offenders. See Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk?: What Employers Say Versus 
What They Do, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 355 (2005). On the disparate racial effects of this phenomenon, 
see Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment 
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by formal operation of law.33 More subtly, conviction can function to 
disrupt or sever social ties that can be key to finding employment.34 And 
even when able to secure a job, convicted individuals on average enjoy 
much lower earning capacity than individuals without a conviction.35 
Dashed or limited employment prospects, research has also shown, in 
turn fuel depression and lessen perceived self-worth, further impairing 
employment prospects.36 
Housing opportunities are also negatively affected by convict status. 
While statutes and regulations impose formal legal limits on public 
housing opportunities,37 landlords in the private sector often informally 
use criminal history as a screening device.38 The fact of criminal 
conviction, ex-convicts report, serves as the single greatest impediment 
to securing housing.39 In turn, homelessness itself, in addition to making 
such matters as job searches far more difficult, increases the likelihood 
of subsequent arrest and conviction.40 
Finally, conviction affects far more than the convicted individual. 
Family and friends endure secondary stigma and ostracism as a result of 
their connection to convicts,41 and it is not uncommon for them to 
experience spill-over violence and disdain.42 It should also come as no 
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231 (2012); Devah Pager et al., 
Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with 
Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195 (2009).  
33. See Marc Mauer, Introduction: The Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment, 30 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1491, 1493 (2003) (noting variety of formal occupational prohibitions).  
34. David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and the Right to 
Clear One’s Name, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1277, 1313–14.  
35. Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 410 (2001).  
36. See, e.g., Andrew E. Clark et al., Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline 
Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J. 222, 233 (2008). 
37. See Eumi K. Lee, The Centerpiece to Real Reform?: Political, Legal, and Social Barriers to 
Reentry in California, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 243, 254 (2010).  
38. Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects: Contemporary 
Residential Tenant-Screening Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 319, 325–26 
(2010); Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not Re(Enter): The Rise of Criminal Background Tenant 
Screening as a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 183 (2009).  
39. KATHARINE H. BRADLEY ET AL., CMTY. RES. FOR JUSTICE, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: HOUSING 
AND THE EX-PRISONER 8 (2001), available at http://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/a5b5d8fa98ed957505_hq 
m6b5qp2.pdf.  
40. J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model for Mitigating Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST. 42, 47–48 (2009). 
41. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear et al., Incarceration and the Community: The Problem of Removing 
and Returning Offenders, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 335, 341 (2001).  
42. See, e.g., Isolde Raftery, Man Sentenced to Life for Killing Sex Offenders; Judge Chastises 
Supporters, U.S. NEWS ON NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 18, 2012, 6:31 PM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/18/13943695-man-sentenced-to-life-for-killing-sex-
offenders-judge-chastises-supporters (recounting Washington State case where two men were shot 
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surprise that the limited housing opportunities of convicts negatively 
affect their families and dependents;43 so too do employment barriers,44 
denied access to federal government loans for education and training45 
and eligibility for food stamps.46 And, when conviction results in 
incarceration, others very often feel its negative effects. Imprisonment 
significantly increases risk of sexual47 and physical assault48 and 
exposure to serious medical problems (such as HIV, tuberculosis, and 
hepatitis).49 It also adversely affects mental health,50 creating significant 
difficulties for individuals that impair their ability to function when 
released.51 These health-related outcomes can have a direct impact on 
family members, exacerbating financial hardships experienced,52 with 
the situation being made worse when the inmate is a sole caregiver.53 
“because they were sex offenders,” and locals who considered the shooter a hero stalked the wife of 
one of the victims, spat on her family and threw objects at her car). 
43. See Heidi Lee Cain, Comment, Housing Our Criminals: Finding Housing for the Ex-Offender 
in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131 (2003); Scott Duffield Levy, The 
Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction 
Program, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539 (2008).  
44. See Sharon M. Dietrich, Criminal Records and Employment: Ex-Offenders Thwarted in 
Attempts to Earn a Living for Their Families, in CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., INC. & CTR. FOR LAW & 
SOC. POLICY, EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 13, 14 
(2002); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 296 (2009).  
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006) (rendering ineligible any student who has been convicted 
of an offense involving the sale or possession of a controlled substance).  
46. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A REPORT ON THE 
STATE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 12 (2004), available at 
http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf. 
47. Tonisha R. Jones & Travis C. Pratt, The Prevalence of Sexual Violence in Prison: The State of 
the Knowledge Base and Implications for Evidence-Based Correctional Policy Making, 52 INT’L J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 280, 289 (2008). 
48. See Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization, 34 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 588, 595 (2007) (noting that inmate violence rate is more than ten times that of the 
rate in the community at-large).  
49. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 275, 280, 295–96 (2008); Michael Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, 
Infectious Disease, and Other Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56 (2008); 
Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of Incarceration on 
Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115 (2007).  
50. See Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison 
Adjustment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON 
CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 33, 37–46 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED]. 
51. Id. at 46–48, 54–56. 
52. See Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul, Prisoners Once Removed: The Children and Families of 
Prisoners, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, supra note 50; Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, 
Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 113 (1999).  
53. See PETERSILIA, supra note 31, at 228–29. In some instances, of course, physical removal of a 
parent can have a beneficial effect. However, research establishes that even criminally active 
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II.  TOWARD A MORE ROBUST UNDERSTANDING 
The consequences surveyed above, while long known to social 
scientists, have to date eluded the attention of criminal justice system 
policymakers and actors. This Part makes the case for a needed broader, 
more robust understanding of collateral consequences, one inclusive of 
those that arise informally beyond formal operation of law. 
Lack of sensitivity to the range of negative extralegal consequences of 
conviction is widespread in the criminal justice system. Courts, for 
instance, while prone to acknowledge the stigmatizing effect of 
conviction,54 typically fail to lend legal significance to its associated 
negative impact. The disinterest was on abundant display in the 2003 
Supreme Court decision Smith v. Doe,55 where the Court concluded that 
Alaska’s sex offender registration and community notification law was 
punitive in neither intent nor effect, allowing it to be imposed 
retroactively consistent with the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.56 
According to the Smith majority, while public dissemination of 
conviction information might have “adverse consequences,” including 
“public shame,” “humiliation,” and “social ostracism,” with a “lasting 
and painful impact,” targeted individuals were not subject to additional 
punishment.57 
From a doctrinal perspective, the Smith majority’s conclusion that the 
overt shaming effects of registration and community notification do not 
qualify as additional punishment is subject to critique.58 At the same 
time, however, the majority’s presumption that convictions have 
informal punitive effect is important, and builds upon recent academic 
work concerning the “experience of punishment.”59 As Professor John 
Bronsteen and his co-authors establish, when considering the 
proportionality of a given sanction, attention must be paid to the range of 
negative hedonic consequences that predictably attend conviction,60 
even when not resulting from formal operation of law.61 
parents can and do provide positive-parenting influence, as well as needed financial support. Id.  
54. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting the “opprobrium and stigma of a 
criminal conviction”).  
55. 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
56. Id. at 103–04.  
57. Id. at 99–101. 
58. See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 136–41.  
59. See John Bronsteen et al., Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1463 (2010) [hereinafter Bronsteen et al., Experience of Punishment]; John Bronsteen et al., 
Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009). 
60. Bronsteen et al., Experience of Punishment, supra note 59, at 1486. 
61. Such a fuller legal understanding, it should be noted, does not require adoption of an unduly 
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Even more significant as a possible objection is the potentially 
contingent and individualized experiential nature of disabilities, a matter 
now the subject of lively debate among penal theorists.62 While in some 
instances the psychological, physical, social, and economic hardships of 
conviction discussed above might be mitigated or avoided altogether as a 
result of individual circumstances, this reality does not alter the baseline 
of convict experience. An individual’s unusual personal charisma or 
relative educational attainment, for instance, might lessen the difficulty 
of securing employment, but the extralegal disability itself, not shared by 
the non-convict population at large, is worthy of recognition. 
A similar point might be made with respect to criminal stigma. It too 
can have a variable quality, depending on the nature of the underlying 
offense,63 and perhaps even among certain individuals64 and sub-
populations.65 Yet even accepting this, its derogatory nature can scarcely 
expansive view of state agency as punisher. While the consequences discussed here are not 
expressly prescribed by legal code, they trace to conviction, a quintessential act of government. Nor, 
from a policy and prudential perspective, does their extralegal quality make them any less real and 
debilitating to those affected. Of late, the question of “who” imposes punishment has been a central 
point of contention for a number of contemporary retributive theorists, who maintain that 
experiences must be intentionally imposed by authorized state agents to qualify as punishment. See 
David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1650–51, 1664 (2010); Dan Markel 
et al., Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 619–20 (2011). 
I take no position on whether extra-legal harms should justify, from a retributivist perspective, a 
punishment “sentencing adjustment[]” as such. See Markel et al., supra, at 619. Indeed, collateral 
consequences, including those of an informal nature, are as a technical matter non-punitive in 
character. Just the same, the disavowal of state responsibility reflects a troubling indifference to the 
ramifications of government action. As the Court unanimously noted in the context of a challenge to 
Alabama’s forced disclosure of NAACP membership lists: 
It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory 
disclosure of names . . . may have . . . follows not from state action but from private [action]. 
The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the 
initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes 
hold. 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); see also Brown v. Socialist 
Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 93 (1982) (noting that there need only be a 
“reasonable probability” that the compelled disclosure of names would subject individuals to 
“threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties” (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976))). 
62. See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1765 n.95 
(2012) (citing work dating back to the 1990s and recent resurgence of interest in the issue). 
63. Convictions for sex offenses, in particular, generate perhaps the most ill will of all. On the 
reasons thought to account for this, see LOGAN, supra note 23, at 91. 
64. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 
748 (1998) (“An offender has to care what others think about him; otherwise, shame can get no grip 
on him. The broader and deeper [an offender’s] attachments, the greater will be his shame. If he 
lacks the requisite attachments . . . he will . . . be ‘shameless’ . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
65. See id. at 749 (asserting that shaming will have less “retributive bite” if an individual’s 
“attachments run to a criminal subculture, in which case ‘shaming’ him may perversely become a 
source of pride”).  
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be questioned.66 As Professor Alexandra Natapoff recently observed, 
“for a person who has been publicly transformed from law-abiding 
citizen into criminal, a significant psycho-social line has been 
crossed.”67 
Likewise, the fact that not all convicts will experience an informal 
disability, and that its onerousness might be individualized, should not 
diminish the need to acknowledge such effects. Indeed, purely as a 
matter of statistical likelihood, the empirical commonality of their 
occurrence affords principled basis for their consideration.68 More 
significant, notwithstanding the indisputably wholesale nature of the 
modern adjudicatory process, defendants enjoy a retail-level right to 
individualized justice,69 one sensitized to such variable effects. 
Despite the foregoing, the justice system has been reluctant to attach 
importance to post-conviction disabilities. Courts have only occasionally 
taken into account harm suffered by third parties when assessing the 
propriety of punishments, almost always in the federal white-collar 
context,70 and as a rule ignore the reputational harms suffered by those 
ensnared in the criminal process.71 And, until Padilla, courts typically 
refused to require pre-plea advisement of formal collateral 
consequences.72 
66. For evidence of this, one need only consider recent efforts by jurisdictions to subject other 
offender groups to registration and notification, and the proliferation of for-profit Internet websites 
and tabloids that publish “mug shots” of individuals merely arrested for offenses, often of a very 
minor nature. See, e.g., Holly Zachariah, Convicted Dealers Featured on Web, THE COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Nov. 11, 2012, 6:28 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/11/11/ 
convicted-dealers-featured-on-web.html (convicted drug dealers); BUSTED MUGSHOTS, 
http://www.bustedmugshots.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (arrests for broad array of non-serious 
offenses, such as trespassing, public intoxication and loitering). Profits also flow to entities charging 
fees to have the public mug shots removed. See Susanna Kim, Businesses Charge Hundreds To 
Remove Mug Shots Online, ABCNEWS.COM (Apr. 23, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Business/businesses-make-profit-copying-mug-shots-online-critics/story?id=16157378. 
67. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (2012).  
68. See supra notes 18–54 and accompanying text.  
69. See, e.g., In re Dir. of Assigned Counsel Plan of N.Y.C., 603 N.Y.S.2d 676, 686 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1993) (noting that the “right to individualized justice . . . is a hallmark of our constitutional and 
democratic system”).  
70. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1390–91 
(2002). This solicitude, Professor Brown concluded from a review of judges’ sentencing 
explanations, is due in significant part to “defendants and third parties in those settings more often 
prompt[ing] empathy.” Id. at 1421.  
71. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). For a critique of Paul v. Davis, with particular 
attention paid to its precedential use by courts concluding that publicized conviction information 
does not trigger procedural due process protection, see Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the 
Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167 (1999).  
72. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1814–15 (2012). As Professor Chin observes, however, 
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Padilla, along with the Court’s more recent opinions in Missouri v. 
Frye73 and Lafler v. Cooper,74 also evincing critical concern over the 
workings of the nation’s plea-driven criminal justice system,75 signal a 
welcome reality-based understanding of the system’s extralegal 
quality.76 Padilla in particular might also signal a desire on the part of 
the Court to do away with the long-criticized doctrinal divide between 
direct and collateral consequences more generally,77 requiring courts, as 
Professor Bibas recently urged, to “focus[] on the importance of 
particular consequences rather than their criminal or civil labels.”78 
Already, the influence of Padilla is showing tangible effect in decisions 
that extend its logic beyond the context of deportation,79 highlighting the 
need to conceive of the challenge at hand in terms of “mass conviction, 
not (just) mass incarceration.”80 
III.  OPERATIONALIZING CHANGE 
Presuming that informal collateral consequences warrant attention, 
the practical question arises of how they can be made more salient in the 
day-to-day criminal justice process. This Part outlines the ways in which 
this can occur, focusing in particular on the institutional roles of the 
chief actors in the nation’s plea-dominated system. 
Without question, responsibility for highlighting the informal 
although unmentioned in Padilla itself, concern over collateral consequences actually did figure in 
prior decisions of the Court, shaping constitutional criminal procedure in areas including the right to 
counsel and jury trial. Id. at 1822–25. 
73. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to inform a client of 
a favorable plea offer constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel). 
74. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (holding that defense counsel’s mistaken legal 
understanding, inducing a client to reject a plea offer, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel). 
75. Id. at 1388 (noting that over ninety percent of convictions in state and federal courts result 
from guilty pleas).  
76. See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1133 (2013) (noting 
that the three cases cement a “right to extralegal counsel [that] applies exclusively to the 
comparatively unstructured domains of the plea-bargain and guilty plea” (emphasis added)). 
77. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2010). On the persistent confusion characterizing 
the issue of direct versus collateral consequences, with only the former kind of consequence 
requiring advisement by counsel, see Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral 
Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124–
25 (2009).  
78. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer 
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1147 (2011); see also id. (“The Sixth Amendment test should 
be not whether a consequence is labeled civil or collateral, but whether it is severe enough and 
certain enough to be a significant factor in criminal defendants’ bargaining calculus.”).  
79. See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences after Padilla v. Kentucky: From 
Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 105–11 (2011). 
80. Chin, supra note 72, at 1803.  
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collateral consequences of conviction will fall chiefly upon defense 
counsel.81 Any suggestion, however, of adding more duties to defense 
counsel—especially already overburdened and underpaid public 
defenders—will likely prompt immediate objection. Indeed, Padilla, 
while lauded by the defense bar in principle, has triggered concern for 
the added counseling burdens it imposed on defenders.82 Deportation, at 
issue in Padilla, affords a foremost example, requiring an understanding 
of a highly specialized and complex body of statutes and regulations.83 
The consequences at issue here, however, do not require sophisticated 
legal expertise. Nor will apprising clients of such consequences impose 
much in the way of added time commitment, a particular concern to 
already overburdened public defenders.84 Counsel will simply be obliged 
to highlight to clients the adverse economic, social, and personal 
consequences possibly resulting from conviction, in keeping with 
increasingly accepted holistic lawyering norms.85 
Other institutional actors, however, can and should also play a role. 
As for prosecutors, acknowledgment of the full consequences of 
conviction aligns with their core duty to “seek justice” in individual 
cases.86 At the same time, consistent with the teachings of procedural 
justice,87 appearing to do justice by being open and transparent affords 
broader public legitimacy benefit. As Robert Johnson, former head of 
81. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50 (1995) (“[I]t is the responsibility of defense 
counsel to inform a defendant of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement . . . .”).  
82. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 
1397–1413 (2011); Shanthi Prema Raghu, Supporting the Criminal Defense Bar’s Compliance with 
Padilla: It Begins with Conversations, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 915, 922, 928 (2011). 
83. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010); see also id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(noting that it is often “not an easy task” to determine whether conviction for a particular offense 
will trigger deportation). 
84. See Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers as a 
Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 MO. L. REV. 885 (2010) (discussing state and national 
data regarding enormous public defender caseloads and litigation mounted to help ameliorate the 
situation). 
85. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral and 
Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067 (2004); McGregor Smyth, 
Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Invisible Punishments as an 
Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479 (2005); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up 
Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1502 (2003) (urging that defense counsel “maintain 
a working knowledge of the potential sentencing consequences of any negotiated settlement”). 
86. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) (1993); see also Catherine 
A. Christian, Collateral Consequences: Role of the Prosecutor, 54 HOW. L.J. 749, 750 (2011) (“[A] 
just and fair prosecutor will consider the collateral consequences that may apply . . . and take them 
into account when considering a disposition.”). 
87. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002).  
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the National District Attorneys Association has stated, when prosecutors 
fail to disclose the full consequences of a brokered conviction they risk 
“suffer[ing] the disrespect and los[ing] the confidence of the very society 
we seek to protect.”88 
With informal collateral consequences put on the table, so to speak, 
the parties will be better positioned to efficiently negotiate outcomes 
based on what Padilla called “informed consideration” of the nature and 
scope of the consequences of conviction.89 It can also be hoped that with 
fuller awareness of the actual consequences of conviction, the balance of 
negotiating power will be affected,90 resulting in increased use of 
diversion and deferred prosecution arrangements, avoiding the negative 
effects of conviction altogether.91 
Ultimately, greater understanding of the range of consequences 
associated with conviction could likewise mitigate what has been called 
“plea bargaining’s innocence problem”: the possibility of legally 
innocent defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offense in order to avoid 
being subjected to much harsher punishment as a result of trial.92 Such 
susceptibility is perhaps especially at play with individuals charged with 
minor offenses, who possibly plead guilty simply so that they can be 
released from detention.93 
Finally, judges can and should play a role. Already, in the wake of 
Padilla, consideration is being given to expanding Rule 11 plea colloquy 
expectations of judges.94 While not a substitute for particularized advice 
88. Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2001, at 32, 33. Cf. Paul H. 
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (2000) (arguing that 
aligning criminal liability with community’s shared sense of fairness and proportionality affords 
consequentialist benefits). 
89. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). 
90. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2470–77 (2004) (discussing effect of information asymmetries on bargaining positions of parties); 
Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 1237, 1240–41 (2008). 
91. See Margaret Colgate Love, Alternatives to Conviction: Deferred Adjudication as a Way of 
Avoiding Collateral Consequences, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 6 (2009).  
92. See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An 
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013). In an effort to redress scholarly uncertainty over the extent of the 
problem’s occurrence, the authors report the results of a clinical study in which over half of the 
study’s innocent participants were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a reduced punishment. 
Id. at 36–37. 
93. See id. at 38 (noting that the study’s results in this regard conform with prior work raising 
concern over factually innocent low-level offenders pleading guilty).  
94. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES TRANSMITTING AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE THAT 
HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT, PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2072, H.R. DOC. NO. 113-
25, at 3–4 (2013) (amendment to Rule 11 adopted by the Supreme Court requiring notice of possible 
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by counsel,95 the sentencing court can reinforce to a pleading defendant 
the informal collateral consequences of conviction.96 Judicial 
advisement will have particular benefit, again, for the large number of 
defendants charged with minor offenses, who if indigent lack access to 
publicly provided counsel at the plea negotiation stage as a result of 
constitutional doctrine97 or procedural rule.98 Indeed, public 
acknowledgement of such consequences by judges in open court will 
have the salutary effect of highlighting the broader human consequences 
of the nation’s penchant for criminal convictions.99 
While the focus here has been on the duties of defense counsel, 
prosecutors, and judges, it should be noted that these actors need not go 
it alone. Indeed, the path can be paved by bar associations and other 
entities that can provide instruction and training on informal collateral 
consequences, much as they have done already in the wake of Padilla 
with respect to the immigration consequences of conviction.100 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to criminal justice, we live in promising times. At long 
last, draconian sentencing policies are being reconsidered and the 
collateral consequences of conviction, triggered by formal operation of 
statutes and regulations, are attracting the critical attention of courts and 
immigration consequences of conviction). 
95. See Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on 
Defendants’ Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 949–60 (2012) 
(discussing why a court’s plea colloquy cannot serve as a substitute for adequate advisory assistance 
of defense counsel).  
96. This reinforcement, it should be noted, is particularly important because, unlike formal 
collateral consequences, informal collateral consequences are not susceptible of back-end 
administrative or judicial relief. See Love, supra note 79, at 121–26 (describing current and possibly 
future avenues of relief from formal collateral consequences). 
97. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (reaffirming the “actual imprisonment” 
standard prescribed in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)). 
98. See, e.g., Justin Marceau & Nathan Rudolph, The Colorado Counsel Conundrum: Plea 
Bargaining, Misdemeanors, and the Right to Counsel, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 327 (2012) (describing 
Colorado rules and practice allowing for “pre-counsel” pleas in misdemeanor cases).  
99. This Essay, it should be emphasized, has focused solely on individual defendant-level effects. 
Research, however, has made clear that mass convictions and incarceration have major negative 
social, political, and economic effects on poor and minority communities as a whole. See, e.g., 
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American 
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). For an argument that such impact should be 
considered by sentencing judges in particular cases, see Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at 
Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423 (2013).  
100. See, e.g., N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL 
COURT SYSTEM, ONE YEAR LATER 4 (2011), available at 
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/PadillaCrimCtsCJOReportFINAL6.15.11.pdf.  
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policymakers. While surely a positive development, this shift in 
consciousness has been lacking in a fundamentally important respect: it 
has ignored the range of informal collateral consequences also attending 
conviction yet not arising by formal operation of law, which can have 
equal if not greater negative effect on individuals. 
This Essay has sought to redress this deficit and make the case that 
informal, and not just formal, collateral consequences should figure in 
the nation’s post-Padilla effort to achieve a fairer and more transparent 
criminal justice system. While without question Padilla marks a 
critically important development in the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
regulate the nation’s plea-dominated system,101 it is unlikely that the 
change urged here will come about as a result of constitutional mandate. 
Rather, the change will of necessity result from the work of front-line 
criminal justice actors determined to ensure that individuals facing 
criminal conviction are sensitized to their prospective membership in 
what has been aptly called “a stigmatized caste, condemned to a lifetime 
of second-class citizenship.”102 
 
101. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 78, at 1118 (noting that Padilla “marks a watershed in the 
Court’s approach to regulating plea bargains”).  
102. James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 31 (2012). 
 
                                                     
